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CREDs, CRUDs, and Catholic Scandals: Experimentally 
examining the effects of religious paragon behaviour on co-
religionist belief 
 
Abstract 
 
Previous research on ‘Credibility Enhancing Displays’ (CREDs) suggests that long-term 
exposure to religious role models ‘practicing what they preach’ aids the acceptance of religious 
representations by cultural learners. Likewise, a considerable amount of anecdotal evidence 
implicates its opposite, perceived ‘religious hypocrisy’ (forthwith ‘Credibility Undermining 
Displays’ or ‘CRUDs’), as a factor in the rejection of religion. However, there is currently little 
causal evidence on whether behaviours of either kind displayed by religious authorities directly 
affect pre-existing religious belief. The current study investigated this question by priming Irish 
self-identified ‘Catholic Christian’ participants with either a clerical ‘CRED’ or ‘CRUD’ and 
subsequently measuring levels of explicit and implicit belief. Our results revealed no effects of 
immediate CRED or CRUD exposure on either implicit religious belief or three different 
measures of explicit religiosity. Instead, explicit (but not implicit) religiosity was predicted by 
past CRED exposure. Prospects and limitations of experimental approaches to CREDs/CRUDs 
are discussed. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Many major religious traditions incorporate a priestly caste expected to exemplify the tenets of 
the creed. Through behaviour which would be costly if they did not believe what they said they 
did, such paragons project the appearance of a deep conviction in the supernatural order they 
verbally endorse. Some of these behaviours are isolated performances, such as the Pope 
washing and kissing feet on Maundy Thursday, while others involve a state of permanent 
behavioural sacrifice. Priestly celibacy, for example, entails the renunciation of sexual intimacy 
and biological continuation via offspring, all the better to serve a supernatural entity who 
cannot be seen and whose existence believers must take on faith. How might behaviours such 
as these bolster the religious conviction of witnesses? Conversely, what might happen to co-
religionist belief when those same paragons are seen to tumble from their moral plinths? 
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 Work in the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR) which draws on dual inheritance 
theory to emphasise the role of context biases in representational transmission suggests that the 
transmission and acceptance of supernatural agent beliefs is aided by the presence of 
‘Credibility Enhancing Displays’ (CRED’s) on the part of cultural models (Henrich, 2009; 
Lanman, 2012). CREDs are instances of ‘practicing what is preached’ – namely costly or hard-
to-fake actions an individual would not perform if they did not believe what they said they did.  
Scholars have proposed that the CRED bias arose as a counter-deception tool in response to 
the dangers of Machiavellian manipulation presented by the evolution of language, and that 
this bias was ‘hacked’ via cultural evolution to raise the credibility of empirically unverifiable 
religious representations, thereby aiding their transmission to and acceptance by witnesses 
(Henrich, 2009). Religious CREDs encompass such activities as costly ritual practice, 
scarification, martyrdom, celibacy, emotional displays, financial donations, dietary taboos, and 
so on. A number of correlational studies have already established a link between past CRED 
exposure and religious belief. Lanman and Buhrmester found that levels of parental CRED 
exposure predicted differences in theism and non-theism, religiosity, and degrees of certainty 
in God’s existence among US Christians while controlling for religious socialisation (Lanman 
& Buhrmester, 2016), while Willard and Cingl found that differing levels of orthodox religious 
belief between culturally similar Slovaks and Czechs are partly attributable to differences in 
childhood CRED exposure (Willard & Cingl, in press). It has also been found that past CRED 
exposure predicts varying levels of ‘implicitly theistic’ responses in Australian atheists 
(Hitzeman & Wastell, in press). 
 The CRED literature also raises a currently unexplored question concerning the effects 
on pre-existing belief of religious cultural model behaviours that run directly contrary to 
professed commitments. Such instances of ‘religious paragon hypocrisy’ could be construed 
as constituting ‘Credibility Undermining Displays’ (CRUDs) for witnessing co-religionists. 
Sociological evidence suggests that perceived religious hypocrisy is an important catalyst for 
US Christian deconversion (Kinnaman & Lyons, 2007, cited in Wollschleger & Beach, 2011), 
including CRUD-type activities such as preachers ‘pocketing’ congregational donations or 
engaging in illicit sexual activity (Wright et al, 2011). Interviews with atheists and the non-
religious also frequently reference hypocrisy as a factor in the rejection of religion (Lanman, 
2012). Beyond Christianity, apostasy from strict religious sects such as Hasidic Judaism has 
been linked to perceived hypocritical religious authorities (Davidman, 2014), as has departure 
from new religious movements (Sauvayre, 2011; Van Leeuwen, 2014). Moral psychologists 
have documented the particular contempt triggered by perceptions of hypocrisy (Haidt, 2006; 
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Monin & Merritt, 2010; Jordan et al, 2017), and it has been suggested that it may be 
increasingly relevant to the abandonment of connected religious commitments as modern 
communication technologies allow damaging information to proliferate in an uncontrollable 
fashion (Shupe, 1997; Donnelly & Inglis, 2010; Dennett & Roy, 2015), magnifying the reach 
and scope of reputation monitoring gossip (Dunbar, 1996). Particularly prolific and sustained 
high-media-profile institutional scandals such as those that have affected the Irish Catholic 
Church in recent decades have even been tenuously linked to accelerations in national 
secularisation trends (Hilliard, 2003; Donnelly & Inglis, 2010; Keenan, 2012; Brown, 2012). 
Finally, hypocrisy accusations (merited or otherwise) have also long been deployed as weapons 
against the credibility of religious groups and figures, from medieval anti-heretic tracts 
(Lambert, 2002) through to contemporary New Atheist anti-religious memes.  
 In sum, although there are numerous findings from sociologists and developmental 
psychologists studying the relationship between behavioural modelling and the 
intergenerational transmission of beliefs that could be taken to corroborate the CRED 
hypothesis to varying degrees (Okagaki et al, 1999; Bader & Desmond, 2006; Baker & Smith, 
2009; Bengston et al, 2013), the cognitive literature pertaining directly to CREDs has thus far 
only produced correlational evidence for a relationship between CRED exposure and religious 
belief, and no work whatsoever on CRUDs. One noteworthy exception providing some causal 
evidence for CREDs is the finding that people are more likely to bet on the truth of a counter-
intuitive proposition if an experimental confederate performs a CRED indicating that they hold 
that proposition to be true (Willard et al, 2016). However, there has yet to be any work 
demonstrating a direct causal influence of CREDs on specifically religious belief, including 
the acceptance of pre-established rather than novel representations. This means that we do not 
know whether CREDs/CRUDs might operate on religious belief purely via a gradual build-up 
of exposure, or whether they might also be able to produce direct, immediate (and presumably 
temporary) effects on existing religious belief, effects that furthermore might only be 
noticeable via implicit measures due to demand characteristics.  
The current study therefore examines the potential direct effects of immediate exposure 
to CREDs and CRUDs on religious belief on both an explicit and implicit level. It does so 
within the specific context of Irish Catholicism, a religious tradition with a clearly delineated 
caste of religious paragons who could plausibly serve as culturally prominent CRED-sources, 
while also having reputedly suffered increased disaffiliation and scepticism due to media-
disseminated instances of high profile religious hypocrisy in the form of clerical abuse scandals 
and Church cover-ups. It was therefore expected that using Irish Catholic participants would 
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have the added benefit of increasing the plausibility, generalisability, and thus efficacy of the 
Catholicism-targeted CRED and, in particular, CRUD primes due to associations participants 
would have developed over the course of the past twenty-five years. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1. Participants and Methods 
185 self-identified Irish Catholic Christians (108 females, mean age = 47.1, SD = 9.8) were 
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: A CRED prime condition (60 participants, 39 
females, mean age = 49.2, SD = 9.2), a CRUD prime condition (64 participants, 34 females, 
mean age = 46.0, SD = 10.1), or a control prime condition (61 participants, 35 females, mean 
age = 46.1, SD = 9.8). All participants were told they were taking part in a study on the effects 
of emotion on the recall of detail from news stories. In each condition, participants were told 
they would see three news stories randomly selected from a pool of over 50. Participants were 
shown two distraction stories before being exposed to the explicit primes (see Appendix B). In 
the CRED condition, participants were exposed to an article about altruistic clerical 
martyrdom; in the CRUD condition participants were exposed to an article about unrepentant 
clerical sexual abuse and institutional complicity; and in the control condition, participants 
were exposed to a neutral cookery article. After reading each story, participants were asked to 
produce a brief summary of the content to check for attention and to ensure deep processing of 
the prime. Prior to launch, the study received Human Subjects approval from the ethical review 
committee at Queen’s University Belfast. The sample size was the maximum possible based 
on cost considerations. 
 After being exposed to the news stories, participants completed a Single Target Implicit 
Association Test (ST-IAT) (Shariff  et al, 2008; Jong et al, 2012), which was used as a measure 
of implicit religiosity theoretically capable of bypassing demand characteristics. During the 
ST-IAT stage, participants are presented with a series of three rounds where they are tasked 
with categorising stimuli as quickly as possible using their keyboard (see image below). In the 
first round, they are presented with synonyms for ‘real’ and ‘imaginary’ which they must 
categorise by pressing one of two assigned keys. In the second and third rounds, participants 
are counterbalanced and given the task of assigning extra religious words to the ‘real’ category 
in one round, and the ‘imaginary’ category in the other. The ST-IAT uses the resulting response 
latencies to measure the swiftness of association between various generic Christian concepts 
(God, Devil, Angel, Demon, Heaven, Hell) and terms synonymous with the opposing poles 
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‘real’ / ‘imaginary’, assigning a d-score to responses whereby minus scores indicate a stronger 
association with ‘imaginary’, while plus scores indicate a stronger association with ‘real’.  
 
 
Image 1: The ST-IAT during rounds 2/3. In this case, participants must assign religious terms to the ‘real’ 
category on the left. 
 
After the ST-IAT, participants completed three explicit measures of religiosity: a 
‘Rejection of Christianity’ scale measuring rejection of specifically Christian doctrine and 
Church authority (Greer & Francis, 1992), a four-item scale measuring social identification 
with Catholicism (Postmes et al, 2013), and a Religious Belief Scale measuring more general 
supernatural/theistic beliefs common in Western populations (Pennycook et al, 2015). Since 
so little is known about how CREDs relate to religiosity, these three explicit measures were 
included in order to investigate the degree to which prime influence might vary across different 
levels: acceptance of specific doctrines and institutions; personal identification with a specific 
religious tradition; theistic beliefs more generally. Finally, participants completed a scale 
measuring past parental CRED exposure (Lanman & Buhrmester, 2016), as this was 
hypothesised to be a potential covariate. 
 We hypothesised that priming with a CRED would 1) lead to higher ST-IAT-scores 
(implicit), higher Catholic identity scores (explicit), higher belief scores (explicit), and lower 
rejection scores (explicit) than in the control condition, and that 2) priming with a CRUD would 
lead to lower IAT-scores (implicit), lower Catholic identity-scores (explicit), lower belief 
scores (explicit), and higher rejection-scores (explicit) than in the control condition.  
 The experiment was conducted online via the Qualtrics Panels recruitment service, with 
participants remunerated on a length-related basis. A week before conducting the experiment, 
1000 potential participants were screened using a brief ‘short term memory test’ distraction 
task followed by demographic questions later used to check for confounds. The relevant 
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screening variables were nationality, religious affiliation, and age. Attention checks were used 
both in the screener and the experiment proper to weed out participants who were not paying 
attention. Only Irish Catholic Christians who passed attention checks and were over 30 years 
of age were selected. The age limit was set to over 30, as this meant that participants would 
have been old enough to have been exposed to substantial amounts of media material pertaining 
to Catholic religious scandals in the past. Those identifying as non-religious were excluded at 
the screening stage, as the experiment sought to manipulate existing levels of religious belief. 
 
2.2. Data Analysis 
To test the hypothesis that 1) priming with a CRED would lead to higher ST-IAT-scores 
(implicit), higher Catholic identity scores (explicit), higher belief scores (explicit), and lower 
rejection scores (explicit) than in the control condition, and that 2) priming with a CRUD would 
lead to lower IAT-scores (implicit), lower Catholic identity-scores (explicit), lower belief 
scores (explicit), and higher rejection-scores (explicit) than in the control condition, we 
performed a linear regression on the relationship between experimental condition and scores 
on the ST-IAT, Rejection of Christianity Scale, Religious Belief Scale, and Catholic Identity 
Scale. To control for previous exposure to CREDs, we tested whether CRED Scale Scores 
improved the model to fit the data using an ANOVA-based model comparison. We only report 
the model with CRED Scale scores as covariate when its fit was significantly better (for a full 
specification of all models, see appendix). Visual inspection of residual plots revealed no 
obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or normality. In order to correct for multiple 
comparisons, we performed a Bonferroni correction of the p-values. Reported p-values are all 
corrected. To perform the analysis we used version 3.3.0 of the statistical software R (R Core 
team, 2016). 
 
3. Results 
3.1. ST-IAT 
Results revealed no significant effect of the CRED condition (Mean = -0.15, SD = 0.24) on 
participants’ d-scores compared to the baseline condition (Mean = -0.27, SD = 0.30) (β = 
0.11546, SE = 0.05192, p = 0.2192), and no significant effect of the CRUD condition (M = -
0.17, SD = 0.24) on participants’ d-scores compared to the baseline condition (β = 0.09214, SE 
= 0.05109, p = 0.5840). Adding CRED Scale Scores to the statistical model did not 
significantly improve the model. 
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3.2. Rejection of Christianity Scale 
Results revealed no significant effect of the CRED condition (Mean = 55.7, SD = 16.6) on 
Rejection Scale Scores compared to the Baseline condition (Mean = 59.9, SD = 18.5) (β = -
0.8893, SE = 3.0317, p = 1), and no significant effect of the CRUD condition (Mean = 60.6, 
SD = 15.8) on Rejection Scale Scores compared to the Baseline condition (β = 1.5180, SE = 
2.8994, p = 1). Instead, results revealed that Rejection scores were predicted by CRED Scale 
scores: an increase of one point in CRED Scale score was related to a decrease of 0.58 points 
in Rejection scores (β = -0.5781, SE = 0.1288, p = 0.0001). 
 
3.3. Catholic Identity Scale 
Results revealed no significant effect of the CRED condition (Mean = 17.3, SD = 8.0) on 
Catholic Identity scores compared to the baseline condition (Mean = 17.4, SD = 7.7) (β = -
2.00915, SE = 1.28124, p = 0.9488), and no effect of the CRUD condition (Mean = 16.1, SD 
= 6.7) on Catholic Identity Scores compared to the Baseline condition (β = -1.71832, SE = 
1.22533, p = 1). Instead, results revealed that Catholic Identity Scores were predicted by CRED 
Scale scores: an increase of one point in CRED Scale score was related to an increase of 0.33 
points on the Catholic Identity scale (β = 0.33418, SE = 0.05442, p < 0.00001). 
 
3.4. Religious Belief Scale 
Results revealed no significant effect of the CRED condition (Mean = 42.1, SD = 17.1) on 
Religious Belief scores compared to the baseline condition (Mean = 37.8, SD = 14.9) (β = 
1.196667, SE = 2.798901, p = 0.669488), and no effect of the CRUD condition (Mean = 38.6, 
SD = 15.1) on Religious Belief scores compared to the Baseline condition (β = 0.009695, SE 
= 2.676754, p = 0.997114). Instead, results revealed that Religious Belief Scores were 
predicted by CRED Scale Scores: an increase of one point in CRED Scale score was related to 
an increase of 0.53 points in Religious Belief scores (β = 0.535218, SE = 0.118891, p = 
0.00010). 
 
 
4. Discussion 
We found no effects of the CRED and CRUD primes on any of the explicit measures of 
religiosity, and no effect on the ST-IAT d-scores associating religious concepts with 
truth/falsity. Null findings could be the result of a number of factors: 1) the absence of any 
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effect; 2) issues with the sample; 3) issues with the manipulation and measures; 4) a smaller 
effect size than could be detected. These will be described in further detail below. 
1) Absence of Effect: Notably, the CRED scale correlated strongly with all explicit 
measures of religiosity. In combination with the experimental null results, the correlational 
CRED data could be taken to suggest that once-off exposures to CREDs or CRUDs may be 
ineffective at even temporarily altering religious attitudes supported by a lifetime of religious 
conditioning (crucially including exposure to repeated past CREDs and CRUDs during 
childhood and adolescence). Aggregated CREDs and CRUDs may be instrumental in forming 
religious attitudes during ontogenesis, but there may be a point at which further exposure 
becomes irrelevant after said religious attitudes have formed. However, the current experiment 
assumed that while we tend to divide populations into ‘believers’ and ‘unbelievers’, it is likely 
that people may in actuality develop multiple co-existing and contradictory attitudes towards 
religious claims, and that these may be contextually activated, for example by immediate 
evaluations of source credibility. Given recent work in the cognitive science of religion 
suggesting religious belief is contextual (Astuti & Harris, 2008), effortful (Luhrmann, 2012; 
Boyer, 2013), and akin to fictional immersion (Van Leeuwen, 2014), it therefore seemed 
plausible that even if identity-linked explicit measures were unaffected by lone 
CREDs/CRUDs, implicit associations between religious concepts and truth/falsity might show 
some kind of temporary response. However, these results could be taken to suggest that 
behavioural religious modelling is instrumental in establishing religious certitudes during 
childhood but, once established, further lone CREDs and CRUDs simply do not produce such 
fluctuations in credence even at a temporary, implicit level. 
 2) Issues with the Sample: At a technical level, the decision to use an online sample 
may have been particularly problematic due to the uncontrolled nature of the environment in 
which the study would have been taken and how this might have affected the efficacy of the 
primes, particularly given that priming studies usually only elicit mild effect sizes. At a more 
conceptual level, surveying and interviewing work conducted alongside the current experiment 
suggested that clerical abuse is a highly prominent association for almost all Irish Catholics. 
Crucially, the sample by definition consisted of people retaining an identity as Catholic 
Christian despite over two decades of clerical abuse revelations and a surrounding environment 
saturated in discussion of religious scandal. While it was hypothesised that this would have 
made the primes more believable by activating a host of past and present associations, it may 
in fact rather have introduced an unmanageable confound, as participants had presumably 
developed strategies which allowed them to retain commitment to a religious tradition widely 
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perceived as contaminated, affecting how the primes were received. The most common 
example would be the ‘bad apple’ interpretation of clerical abuse, where institutional 
culpability is downgraded and attention is focussed on the individual transgressor, quarantining 
the overall tradition from damage. The CRUD prime included content relating to institutional 
complicity in order to counter this ‘quarantining’ possibility, but the problem may be deeper 
than this. ‘Irish Catholic Christian’ is a broad category encompassing everything from 
‘cultural’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘lapsed’ Catholics to orthodox religious conservatives, meaning reactive 
strategies will vary. Interference with the primes could therefore manifest in a number of 
contrasting ways. For example, some have rejected the Church while retaining a Catholic 
identity and personalised idiosyncratic theism (Inglis, 1998). This could mean that priests as a 
category no longer function as religious paragons for such individuals, likely undermining the 
efficacy of clerical CRED/CRUD primes, but it could also on the contrary be that such 
individuals have lower past CRED exposure and fewer autobiographical memories pertaining 
to Catholic socialisation, making the primes more effective as they have fewer past associations 
to contend with. Beyond this, Ireland is host to a contested and polarising process of 
institutional secularisation involving the frequent weaponisation and deflection of religious 
hypocrisy as rival actors seek to retain or reduce lingering Catholic influence in various social 
spheres. This means that it is likely that more conservative Catholics may treat reportage of 
clerical abuse as an out-group attack issuing from hostile secularists, potentially preventing the 
primes (in this case in particular, newspaper stories) from being absorbed at face value. In this 
case, CRUD primes may well produce a consolidation of religious identity and connected 
beliefs. Future work regarding the effects of CRUDs in CRUD-saturated environments would 
benefit from parsing out specific sub-groups sharing reactive strategies within overall religious 
traditions, a necessity that would likely complicate designs greatly. It may therefore be simpler 
to initially conduct studies among populations with less experience of religious paragon 
hypocrisy where entrenched cultural reactions may not be so much of an issue before 
attempting to tackle populations drawn from such environments. Another strategy would be to 
use more novel CRUD primes not related to widely reported instances of religious hypocrisy. 
Such a situation would mean that religious participants would have to process the novel CRUD 
for the first time, overcoming the problem of swift habituated responses and potentially 
creating a window of opportunity to measure immediate effects on belief. Finally, the degree 
to which CRUDs might prompt the rejection of religious representations would vary a great 
deal according to such factors as the degree of emphasis placed on religious authority figures 
by different institutions and traditions, the degree to which such figures are viewed as 
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representatives of a sacred category of specialists versus private individuals, and the degree to 
which the surrounding religious environment constitutes an open ‘religious marketplace’ 
providing ample opportunities for religious switching or a hegemonic environment primarily 
affording outright religious rejection (e.g. Finke & Stark, 1996). Such factors should also be 
taken into account in future samples. 
 3) Manipulation and Measures: Issues pertaining to potentially confounding 
interactions between the sample and the priming manipulations have been broached above. A 
further problem is that out of a desire to send participants as quickly as possible into the ST-
IAT stage before the primes faded, the procedure did not include a manipulation check (for 
example, a word completion task) that would have enabled verification that the primes had 
produced an effect (although participants did briefly summarise the prime, thereby providing 
evidence that they had at least absorbed it to some extent). The measures, in particular the ST-
IAT, may also have constituted a problem. The ST-IAT utilised generic Christian terminology 
and was chosen because today it is far easier to find Catholics who accept such representations 
than those who report literal beliefs in transubstantiation, Papal infallibility, and other esoteric 
and specifically Catholic doctrines. However, contemporary generically Christian beliefs can 
co-exist as a kind of ‘moral therapeutic deism’ (Smith, 2005) alongside an ethnically Catholic 
identity and rejection of or even hostility towards the institutional Church, reducing the 
effectiveness of the primes as CREDs/CRUDs since the ‘paragon’ involved in the news stories 
is no longer evaluated as a religious model for the individualised versions of the representations 
in question. If seeking implicit Catholic CRED/CRUD effects, further studies should use an 
ST-IAT with highly specific Catholic concepts after all, and recruitment should focus on a 
Catholic environment where orthodox belief is higher (the Philippines, for example). It is 
possible that in such a setup, overall implicit acceptance would be lower due to the esoteric 
concepts, but the differences between conditions would be greater due to their more 
unambiguous linkage with the authority figures featured in the primes, thereby revealing 
doctrinally specific CRED and CRUD effects suppressed by the generic terminology used by 
the present measure. A further complicating factor regarding the ST-IAT result is that, unlike 
the explicit measures, scores did not correlate with past CRED exposure. This opens up at least 
two possibilities requiring further investigation, firstly that the ST-IAT is a poor measure of 
implicit religiosity, or secondly that professed religious belief is best understood as form of 
reflectively held meta-representational commitment tied to social identity and actually bears 
relatively little relation to the degree to which a person intuitively holds supernatural 
representations to be real (e.g. Sperber, 1996; Van Leeuwen, 2014). Limiting ourselves to the 
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first possibility, while IATs have generally been championed as a means of bypassing socially 
desirable responding, they have also been the subject of much recent controversy revolving 
around both their low degree of test-retest reliability and what it is that they actually measure 
(‘implicit attitudes’ or merely culturally salient semantic associations), with contrasting meta-
analyses claiming to vindicate or indict the paradigm (Greenwald et al, 2009; Oswald et al, 
2013). While experimental designs relying purely on explicit measures would be unsatisfactory 
due to demand characteristics and entrenched social identities as religious/non-religious, it may 
behove future designs to replace the ST-IAT with a more reliable behavioural measure.  
4) Effect Size: A final possibility may be that the measures employed in the study were 
simply not sensitive enough to detect subtle changes in explicit and implicit religiosity. This 
could be addressed by changing the measures as per the suggestions above (a behavioural 
measure would be particularly suitable), or it could potentially be detected by administering a 
repeated measures design of some kind in the future.  
In order to estimate the minimum effect size that could be reliably (power = 0.8) 
assessed with a sample size of 185 participants (our current sample) we conducted a post hoc 
sensitivity power analysis relying on the software G*power 3.1. For model1a (see appendix) 
the minimum effect size to be reliably assessed is F2 = 0.05 and for all the other models is F2 
= 0.06. These minimum effect sizes correspond to R2 effects sizes (percentage of variance in 
the outcome explained by the model) of 0.05 or smaller, that is, less than 5% of variance 
explained. It is questionable if anyone would be interested in such a small effect.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The current study represents a first pass at experimentally examining the immediate effects of 
religious paragon behaviour on witnessing co-religionist belief, a topic that has yet to be 
addressed in the CSR literature on CREDs/CRUDs and their role in the acceptance of religious 
representations. By laying out the methods used and limitations entailed, we hope that this 
initial effort will prove instructive to those interested in designing future experiments on this 
subject. The CRED and CRUD primes were found to have no significant effect on explicit 
measures of religious belief and identity, but scores on the explicit measures were found to be 
predicted by past CRED exposure. The manipulations also had no effect on implicit belief as 
measured by the ST-IAT. The findings support existing work linking CRED exposure to 
intergenerational religious transmission (Lanman, 2012; Lanman & Buhrmester, 2016), and 
could also be taken to suggest that lone CREDs/CRUDs have little impact on prior 
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commitments established over long periods of time: CREDs are relevant to belief at an 
ontogenetic but not an immediate level. The results could also be taken to suggest that the 
relationship between religious hypocrisy and apostasy evident in the sociological literature is 
most likely an indirect one: hypocrisy does not create an immediate effect on witness belief, 
but may prompt re-examination of the value of membership in the religious coalition 
(Wollschleger & Beach, 2011), something which may subsequently lead over time to the 
reflective rejection of connected religious representations. However, the current results should 
be interpreted with caution, as they may also result from features of the experimental design 
(for example, the relatively non-specific Christian conceptual associations measured by the 
ST-IAT), or the fact that the participant group are accustomed to religious scandals (putatively 
leading to swift defensive reactions against perceived attacks or the rejection of traditional 
religious authority figures as religious models) rather than the absence of direct CRED/CRUD-
type effects on religious belief. Further studies which address these methodological limitations 
are required to clarify whether CREDs/CRUDs have a direct effect on religious belief. 
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6. Appendices 
Appendix A: Statistical Models 
 
Table 1: Full specification for all models.  
All p-values are corrected for multiple comparisons. 
(* designate the model with the best fit) 
Model Dependent variable R code 
Independent 
Variable 
ß  SE p-value 
1* IAT lm(IAT ~ Condition, Data) 
CRED-prime 0.11546 0.05192 0.2192 
CRUD-prime 0.09214 0.05109 0.5840 
1a IAT lm(IAT ~ Condition + Cred_Scale, Data) 
CRED-prime 0.12079 0.05365 0.2048 
CRUD-prime 0.09343 0.05131 0.5624 
CRED Scale -0.00093 0.00227 1 
2 
Rejection of 
Christianity 
Scale 
lm(reject ~ Condition, Data) 
CRED-prime -4.202 3.091 1 
CRUD-prime 0.710 3.042 1 
2a* 
Rejection of 
Christianity 
Scale 
lm(reject ~ Condition + 
Cred_Scale, Data) 
CRED-prime -0.8893 3.0317 1 
CRUD-prime 1.5180 2.8994 1 
CRED Scale -0.5781 0.1288 0.00010 
3 Catholic Identity Scale 
lm(Catholic_Identity ~ 
Condition, Data) 
CRED-prime -0.09399 1.36225 1 
CRUD-prime -1.25128 1.34062 1 
3a* Catholic Identity Scale 
lm(Catholic_Identity ~ 
Condition + Cred_Scale, Data) 
CRED-prime -2.00915 1.28124 0.9488 
CRUD-prime -1.71832 1.22533 1 
CRED Scale 0.33418 0.05442 0.00001 
4 Religious Belief Scale 
lm(belief_total ~ Condition, 
Data) 
CRED-prime 4.2639 2.8548 1 
CRUD-prime 0.7577 2.8094 1 
4a* Religious Belief Scale 
lm(belief_total ~ Condition + 
Cred_Scale, Data) 
CRED-prime 1.19667 2.79890 1 
CRUD-prime 0.00970 2.67675 1 
CRED Scale 0.53522 0.11889 0.00010 
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Appendix B: Priming Materials 
 
1. CRUD Prime 
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2. CRED Prime 
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3. Control Prime 
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